I saw a quote recently about liquidity. An old hand was saying that it was a slippery (!) concept that even smart new traders didn't readily grasp until they didn't have any and then it became frighteningly clear.
I think the same realisation is dawning on me and a lot of other 'sophisticated' investors concerning equities. There is a widely held view that equities are solid, 'real' assets. I even heard a guy who worked for the equities division at UBS once make the comment that he worked for the bit that traded solid shares in blue-chip companies, not flakey bonds and risky fixed-interest products. The essence of equities is that they are a residual claim on the cash flows of a company after all the other claims have been met in full. They are, thus, more junior than the most junior subordinated deferrable preference shares, and certainly more junior than the most unsecured debt.
I think that part of the problem of understanding the nature of equity comes from the idea that the shareholders 'own' the company, as evidenced by the fact that they alone have a say in who the directors are, whether a takeover offer should be accepted, and whether they wish to be first in the queue to provide more capital through a rights issue. The success of the company is evidenced principally by the share price going up, without much attention being paid to the other creditors.
The alternative view, as discussed in books like Brearley and Myers, is that, in fact, the equity holders have a call option on the assets of the company, and that the strike price of this option is the value of all the other more senior obligations of the enterprise. This is clearly the case: if bonds issued by a company cannot be redeemed, then the bondholders are given all the assets of the company instead. Of course creditors form a queue and it may be that other creditor rank ahead of the bond holders, but clearly the people at the very backmost position in the queue are the shareholders.
This explains why shares are not always a good investment in times of high inflation. The idea that shares represent 'real assets' suggests that a good purging dose of inflation, as we are probably facing right now, should be good for shares. For a company with real assets - say a large manufacturer with extensive factories it owns itself - this is probably true. The problem is that other forms of credit tend to get expensive and risky in times of high inflation, so that the head of the queue are taking more of the gross cashflow. Certainly once inflation gets a hold, creditors need to be protected against the macroeconomic uncertainty of real returns and will, overall, make their credit more expensive.
In a rising market in an environment of rapid economic growth, gearing, both financial and operational, have been sought after. The amplification of profits 'attributable to shareholders' have been welcomed by boards and investors. The fact that the variance of returns, i.e. the risk of the investment, has been amplified too has been brushed aside as an of purely academic interest. The fact that Modigliani and Miller pointed out that risk-adjusted returns to equity holders were not enhanced by gearing is never mentioned by corporate financiers or boards of directors. This is no trivial observation - the pair were given a Nobel Prize in Economics in 1985 for discovering it.
Now of course we all see how clear sighted these gentlemen were. We understand that capital adequacy ratios for banks are not there just to give structured finance experts an incentive for devising more and more Byzantine off-balance-sheet ways of holding assets. We are beginning to understand why Mssrs Glass and Steagall were not simply spoilsports. We understand that it is not an unalloyed Good Thing for companies to use all of their net cashflow in buying back shares rather than paying dividends no matter how tax-efficient and EPS flattering it might be.
We have enjoyed the party while it lasted. The hangover is going to be a severe one.
